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The Companionship of Our Four Legged Family Members:

I.

Priceless.1

INTRODUCTION

An increasing number of American households regard their companion animals2 as being as much a part of their family as they do their human
∗
Associate Professor of Legal Writing at Suffolk University Law School, Boston,
Massachusetts. I would like to thank the administration at Suffolk Law School for their
support of my work, and my colleagues in the Legal Practice Skills Department, specifically,
Professors Kathleen Elliott Vinson and Gabriel Teninbaum, for their guidance and advice. I
am eternally grateful to have had the invaluable help of my research assistant, Alexis P.
Theriault. Finally, a special thank you to Abner, for inspiring the topic of this article.
1.
See Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Indus., Inc., 131 P.3d 1248, 1250 (Kan. Ct. App.
2006). The court wrote:
[W]hat is the value of a wet face licking received first thing in the morning? To a “cat person” it is probably nothing but to a dog owner who has
raised her friend from a puppy it is like the Master Card ad-priceless.
What is the value of years of companionship, of training, of shared love?
To put a value on a family pet all of this must be considered.
Id.
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family members; however, companion animals have not always held this
status. The role companion animals serve has evolved from property—
whose function was to derive economic benefit—to family members who
share a unique emotional bond with their human companions. The judiciary
has failed to keep pace with this societal change. The human-animal bond is
not extinguished upon the death of the companion animal. Rather, this bond
often causes extensive emotional suffering by the human companion when
the animal is injured or killed by a third-party’s intentional or negligent act.
Despite judicial recognition that the role of companion animals has become
akin to that of a family member, decisions continue to provide an inconsistent statement of the non-economic damages available to the human companion.3 Recent decisions indicate that the judiciary is ready for the legislature to step in and provide an avenue by which the courts may grant noneconomic damages.4 Codification by state legislatures may also remedy
inconsistent judicial opinions and allow human companions to recover for
their emotional suffering when they lose a four-legged family member to
the intentional or negligent act of a third-party.
Part I of this article reviews the history of companion animals in
American households.5 It discusses the changing attitudes towards companion animals with a focus on the anthropomorphism of companion animals
in recent decades. Part II reviews a representative selection of judicial opinions rendering inconsistent precedent on the ability of human companions
to recover non-economic damages6 for their emotional suffering as a result
of the loss of their companion animal.7 Part III reviews three existing statutes and addresses the present state of legislation that would permit the human companion recovery for emotional damages.8 Part IV makes recom-

2.
Definition of Companion Animal, AM. SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY,
http://www.aspca.org/about-us/policy-positions/definition-of-companion-animal.aspx (last
visited Feb. 2, 2011). The terms “companion animal” and “pets” are used interchangeably
and commonly defined as domesticated or domestic-bred animals “whose physical, emotional, behavioral and social needs can be readily met as companions in the home, or in close
daily relationship with humans.” Id. For purposes of this article the phrase “companion
animal” primarily refers to dogs and cats.
3.
See infra notes 59-95 and accompanying text.
4.
See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
5.
See infra Part I (discussing evolution of status of companion animals in American households).
6.
As used in this article the terms “non-economic damages” shall include emotional distress, loss of companionship, love and society.
7.
See infra Part II (discussing opinions concerning recovery of non-economic
damages).
8.
See infra Part III (discussing legislation concerning recovery of non-economic
damages).
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mendations for other states to enact similar statutes which codify a human
companion’s right to recover emotional damages.9
II

THE EVOLVING STATUS OF COMPANION ANIMALS

Pet keeping is a universal human habit.10 Over the past three hundred
years, however, the human-animal relationship has changed significantly.11
Once beasts of burden kept solely to serve their owners, animals now share
the comfort of their owners’ homes and offer companionship rather than
service.12
Historical accounts dating back to the eighteenth century reflect a reoccurring theme of animal as servant.13 Present day companion animals
provided physical labor in addition to the resources necessary for human
comfort, with the breed or size of the animal often determining its job.14
Small dogs protected the goods of street vendors, turned cooking spits, butter churns, cider presses and generated power for various types of machinery, including cotton gins.15 Larger, mild-mannered breeds hauled cargo,
passenger wagons, and herded cattle before slaughter.16 Even “ill-tempered
dogs” were useful during war times as prison guards.17 In urban areas, cats
were kept or rented to catch mice.18
After a day’s work, these animals were provided only with as much
food as their owner’s social status allowed.19 Even if their work required

9.
See infra Part IV (recommending legislation concerning recovery of noneconomic damages).
10.
See STEPHEN ZAWISTOWSKI, COMPANION ANIMALS IN SOCIETY 6 (2008); see also
Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals
in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (1995) (noting research suggests human life included
domesticated dogs since 6,300 B.C.).
11.
See ZAWISTOWSKI, supra note 10, at 3 (discussing varied roles pets have played
in American society).
12.
See infra notes 13-43 and accompanying text.
13.
See KATHERINE GRIER, PETS IN AMERICA, A HISTORY 159-160 (2006).
14.
See GRIER, supra note 13, at 160; See also MARY ELIZABETH THURSTON, THE
LOST HISTORY OF THE CANINE RACE, OUR 15,000-YEAR LOVE AFFAIR WITH DOGS 122
(1996).
15.
See THURSTON, supra note 14, at 122; MARK DERR, A DOG’S HISTORY OF
AMERICA, HOW OUR BEST FRIEND EXPLORED, CONQUERED, AND SETTLED A CONTINENT 75
(2004). The services provided by these animals coined the terms, “Turnspits” and “Trekhonds.” Id. at 122.
16.
See THURSTON, supra note 14, at 122; DERR, supra note 15, at 75.
17.
THURSTON, supra note 14, at 175; See also DERR, supra note 15, at 170-71
(discussing other jobs for dogs from hunters to protectors).
18.
GRIER, supra note 13, at 35.
19.
See, e.g., GRIER, supra note 13, at 83, THURSTON, supra note 14 at 232;
ZAWISTOWSKI, supra note 10, at 31-32. Cats and dogs owned by poor families dined on
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them to be indoors, they slept outside—in accordance with the customary
practice—until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.20 These conditions affected the animals’ health; “animal-specialists” or common day
veterinarians were a rarity, and even the best cared for animals did not live
as long as their modern-day counterparts.21 When not fulfilling the “animal
as servant” role, dogs often were considered unwanted pests.22 Abuse was
common when the animals failed to perform their work.23
Over time, mechanical conveniences—and human organizations—put
an end to the working cat and dog.24 By the late nineteenth and early twentieth century “civilizing” animals gained popularity.25 The shift in perception of the role of companion animals began with royalty.26 Dogs became
more a symbol of luxury than of service. The 1877 Westminster Kennel
Club Dog Show’s addition of a non-sporting dog category demonstrated the
luxury role that dogs obtained within the upper class.27
As pet ownership became more luxurious so did the animals’ lifestyles. Owners became more concerned with providing their pets with
proper nutrition.28 Pet equipment such as collars and cages—once used

garbage while middle class animals dined on their owner’s leftovers. GRIER, supra note 13,
at 83.
20.
GRIER, supra note 13, at 62-63.
21.
See id. at 90 (citing OLIVE THORNE MILLER, OUR HOME PETS: HOW TO KEEP
THEM WELL AND HAPPY 199-200 (1894)). Animal specialists did not have time for “useless
pets” and the reliance by owners on the advice of human druggists resulted in shorter life
spans for animals. See id. at 88.
22.
DERR, supra note 15, at 144 (noting when not “ratting” terriers treated as unwanted pests).
23.
THURSTON, supra note 14, at 127. While abuse was common, even in this early
period humans debated the moral qualities of animals, believing that dogs were sage and
faithful and, therefore, should not be subject to brutality. This was exemplified by the protests raised when a man wanted to use 40 dogs to power a cotton mill. See DERR, supra note
15, at 75.
24.
See THURSTON, supra note 14, at 139; See also Katherine K. Grier & Nancy
Peterson, Indoor Cats, Scratching and the Debate over Declawing: When Normal Pet Behavior Becomes a Problem, in THE STATE OF ANIMALS III: 2005 27 (DJ Salem and AN
Rowan, eds. 2005).
25.
GRIER, supra note 13, at 75-76 (noting appearance on bookshelves of manuals
and guides about civilizing animals). Dogs were believed to be the most “trainable” because
of their domestication. Id. Naturalists Charles Darwin, John Muir, Jack London and their
contemporaries believed dogs were sentient beings and not beasts of burden. See DERR,
supra note 15, at 215-16 (discussing the celebration of dogs as companions and experience
of nature rather than as workers).
26.
ZAWISTOWSKI, supra note 10, at 31.
27.
See DERR, supra note 15, at 173; See also ZAWISTOWSKI, supra note 10, at 37
(noting that the first major American cat show was held in Madison Square Garden in 1895).
28.
THURSTON, supra note 14, at 233. In 1860, James Spratt sold the first biscuit
made just for dogs, “Spratt’s Dog Cakes.” Its success spurred the development of other
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solely to restrain and control animals—became a fashion accessory.29 Luxury pet industries, such as those for grooming and fashion accessories, began to grow.30 By the mid-twentieth century dogs began to live indoors and,
in response, luxury pet industries further expanded into selling dog beds
and couches.31 Following the functional and understated accessories available during the Depression, the 1950s and 1960s saw a rise in whimsical
dog clothing including fur coats and gemmed collars.32
In mainstream American society by the end of the twentieth century,
the role of pets had evolved from service to pure companionship.33 In the
first decade of the twenty-first century, the pet industry has grown into a
multi-billion dollar enterprise with Americans expected to spend nearly
$47.7 billion on their pets in 2010.34 These numbers are not the result of a
thriving economy, but rather, of a shift in societal attitude: pets have become members of the family.35 A recent study indicates that 85% of dog
owners consider their pet to be a member of the family, and not just any
family member: growing numbers of pet owners are treating their compan-

companies forming the foundation of the pet food industry as it exists today. See
ZAWISTOWSKI, supra note 10, at 138.
29.
GRIER, supra note 13, at 274-75. Pearls and eighteen-carat gold collars replaced
the once understated and leather collars. By the end of the Twentieth Century, high-tech
electronic collars designed by NASA engineers replaced simple hand-made collars. See
THURSTON, supra note 14, at 224 (discussing shift to luxurious and technological products).
30.
THURSTON, supra note 14, at 209.
31.
GRIER, supra note 13, at 308. See Grier & Peterson, supra note 24, at 23 (discussing how sale of kitty litter in the 1940s made it easier to keep cats indoors).
32.
GRIER, supra note 13, at 11. See also THURSTON, supra note 14, at 222-23.
33.
See Kathy Haight, Paradise for pets: ‘Resorts’ that cater to furry friends,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(June
14,
2010),
available
at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/homegarden/2012093973_petsluxury14.html (noting
that during the mid-to-late-1990s pets became members of the family).
34.
See Press Release, American Pet Prods. Ass’n, Pet Industry Grows More than
5% in 2009 and Anticipates Nearly 5% Growth Again This Year (Feb. 8, 2010), available at
http://media.americanpetproducts.org/press.php?include=141525; see also Ellen Warren,
For owners, it’s more than puppy love, CHI. TRIBUNE, Apr. 29, 2010, at 5 (discussing pets
taking on role of first child). In 2009, Americans spent $45.5 billion and despite the slow
economy the pet industry is one of the fastest-growing industries experiencing a 5.4% sales
increase from 2008. Lana Berkowitz, Booming pet industry, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Feb. 23,
2010), available at http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/Booming_pet_industry.html.
35.
See Press Release, American Pet Prods. Ass’n, Despite Tough Economic Climate Americans Remain Loyal to Their Pets (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://media.americanpetproducts.org/press.php?include=140841 (discussing research reflecting nationwide trend that economic downturn will not affect pet spending). Spending in
the majority of low income households has similarly remained unchanged. See id. Pet parents will cut back on personal spending before scaling back on purchases for pets. See id.
(quoting APPA President who attributed this to strength of human-animal bond).
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ion animal as a child.36 These so called “pet-parents” practice what they
preach by buying their pets holiday gifts,37 dressing them in designer goods,
transporting them in designer carriers and strollers,38 scheduling play dates
with other dogs,39 and providing health insurance,40 as well as the best in
day-care.41
36.
April Pedersen, The DOG Delusion, THE HUMANIST, Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 25. See
Press Release, American Pet Prods. Ass’n, New Survey Reveals that When it Comes to
Caring for Our Faithful Companions American Pet Owners are Top Dog (Aug. 31, 2009),
available at http://media.americanpetproducts.org/press.php?include=140291 [hereinafter
Press Release, Top Dog] (stating survey results that pet owners appreciate companionship,
love, company and affection offered by pets and consider dogs/cats as children and family
members). Fifty percent of pet owners consider their pets to be as much a part of the family
as any other member of the household. New Poll Reveals Americans Often Treat Pets Like
Humans,
PETSIDE.COM
(June
23,
2009),
http://www.petside.com/thesidewalk/ap_pets_poll.php (summarizing Associated Press-Petside.com survey results). See
Kristen Levine, Can Pets Take the Place of Children, PETSIDE.COM (June 1, 2009),
http://www.petside.com/wellness/can-pets-take-the-place-of-children.php (discussing over
60% of dog owners believe caring for pet fulfills need to parent according to American
Animal Hospital Association survey); see also Lucy Jen Huang Hickrod & Raymond L.
Schmitt, A Naturalistic Study of Interaction and Frame: The Pet as “Family Member,” 11
URB. LIFE 55, 59 (1982) (“Persons behave toward pets as if they are family members. Pets
are named, fed, groomed, photographed, talked to, protected, and mourned. Owners sleep
and play with pets. They give them birthday parties [,] . . . [r]ansom has been paid for pets . .
. and a dog has participated as the best man in a human wedding.”); Elizabeth Paek, Fido
Seeks Full Membership in the Family: Dismantling the Property Classification of Companion Animals by Statute, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 481, 482-83 (2003) (“[M]ore than 80% of companion animal guardians consider their companion animals as family members . . . [a]nother
study revealed that 70% considered their companion animals as children.”).
37.
See AP-Petside Poll: Pet Holiday Gift Spending Up in 2009, PETSIDE.COM
(Nov.
23,
2009),
http://www.petside.com/the-sidewalk/appetside_poll_pet_holiday_gift_spending_up_in_2009.php (summarizing survey results). In
2008, 43% of pet owners planned to buy holiday gifts for their pets, however, by 2009 52%
answered yes to the same question reflecting a 9% increase. Id. Giving gifts continues to rise
in popularity as many pet parents buy gifts without waiting for a special occasion. See Press
Release, Top Dog, supra note 36.
38.
See Berkowitz, supra note 34 (noting possible to equip the 2010 Honda Element
with cushioned pet bed, fan, seat covers with dog-pattern design and extendible ramp).
39.
Laurette Folk, Yes, That’s My Baby: Who says my husband and I can’t consider
our dog part of the family, THE BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE, Dec. 19, 2010, at 34.
40.
See Laura Bennett, Pet Industry Trends for 2010, SMALL BUSINESS TRENDS (Jan.
14, 2010), http://smallbiztrends.com/2010/01/pet-industry-trends-for-2010.html (estimating
pet insurance market to reach $400 million in premiums in 2010).
41.
See Pedersen, supra note 36. The humanization of pets has resulted in a quickly
disappearing gap in the quality of life between humans and pet companions. See Press Release, American Pet Prods. Ass’n, supra note 34 (quoting American Pet Products Association president); See also William C. Root, Note, ‘Man’s Best Friend’: Property Or Family
Member? An Examination Of The Legal Classification Of Companion Animals And Its Impact On Damages Recoverable For Their Wrongful Death Or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423,
435-37 (2002) (discussing how Americans consider in addition to treat their pets like family
members). This gap also appears to be disappearing in the afterlife. In 1896, the Hartsdale
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This tangible evidence of companion animal integration into the family structure clearly demonstrates the emotional investment human companions make in their companion animals.42 Companion animals provide a
source of unconditional love for their owners, resulting in an emotional
dependence on the animal by the human companion.43 These emotions—as
well as the human-animal bond—are not extinguished upon the death of the
companion animal.44 The human companion experiences a deep sense of

Pet Cemetary, the first cemetery exclusively devoted to pet burial opened in this country in
the state of New York. ZAWISTOWSKI, supra note 10, at 219. Over one hundred years later
this pet cemetery remains open and, in addition to the approximately 75,000 pets that have
been buried there, an estimated 700 and growing number of people have chosen to be buried
with their pets whom they consider to have been their lifetime companions. Jim Fitzgerald,
Spending more time – say, forever – with your pet, BOSTON.COM,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2011/02/05/spending_more_time____say_forev
er____with_your_pet/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
42.
See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text (describing manifestations of
affection by human companions); see also Folk, supra note 39, at 34 (describing strong
emotional bond human companions feel for animal companions with the Random House
definition of love “a profoundly tender, passionate affection [and] a personal attachment”).
43.
See Press Release, American Pet Prods. Ass’n, Cats Provide Companionship,
Company
and
Love
(undated),
available
at
http://media.americanpetproducts.org/press.php?include=141378 (reporting APPA National
Pet Owners Survey indicated 89% cat owners reported companionship as benefit to ownership); Press Release, Top Dog, supra note 36 (reporting 2009-2010 APPA National Pet
Owners Survey results that more than 75% of pet owners appreciate companionship offered
by pets); Levine, supra note 36 (reporting over 50% of pet owners surveyed by American
Animal Hospital Association feel emotional dependence on pets); See also Squires-Lee,
supra note 10, at 1065 (discussing human-animal bond); See generally Sandra B. Barker,
Therapeutic Aspects of the Human-Companion Animal Interaction, 16 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES,
no 2., Feb. 1, 1999. Barker chronicles the psychological study of the human-animal bond:
Early surveys reported a strong psychological and emotional attachment
between people and their pets, and the term human-animal bond
emerged to represent this attachment. Studies revealed that most pet
owners view their pets as both enhancing the quality of family life by
minimizing tension between family members and enhancing their
owner’s compassion for living things. Using a projective technique to
investigate owners’ closeness to their pet dogs, Barer and Barker found
that dog owners were as emotionally close to their dogs as to their closest family member. They reported that more than one-third of the dog
owners in the study were actually closer to their dogs than to any human
family member.
Id. at 45 (internal citations omitted).
44.
See Squires-Lee, supra note 10, at 1069-71 (discussing grief experienced following death of companion animal); see also Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law
Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society, and Loss of Companionship for the
Wrongful Death of a Companion Animal, 4 ANIMAL L. 33, 47-49 (1998) (discussing humananimal bond and similar grief reactions following death of pet as that follow death of other
family member); ZAWITOWSKI, supra note 10, at 217 (noting substantial change in grief
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loss upon the untimely death of the companion animal similar to that which
is experienced following the death of a family member.45 Where the death
results from an intentional or negligent act, these feelings may become even
more pronounced.46 Some states have enacted anti-cruelty criminal laws
designed to punish and deter acts of cruelty that result in death or injury to a
companion animal, however, these laws do not provide any direct form of
recovery to the human companion.47 Where the animal’s death is the result
of a third-party’s tortious conduct, the feelings of loss are equally as pro-

counseling associated with pet loss in recent decades). The New York legislature has codified its recognition of the loss experienced by human companions:
The legislature hereby finds and declares that the relationships that humans develop with other members of the animal kingdom that are taken
into our homes and kept as pets are unique and special. These relationships can enrich our lives and increase our happiness. Even after the
death of a pet, human attachment to the memory of the pet often remains
very strong and many people feel the need to memorialize their love for
their animal . . . .
NY GEN. BUS. § 750 (1999).
45.
See Womack v. Von Rardon, 135 P.3d 542, 544 (Wash. 2006) (noting trial court
findings that plaintiff experienced guilt, loss and grief causing sleepless nights and depressive periods after plaintiff’s cat was doused with gasoline and set on fire). See generally
William Key, Thanatology: Death of a Pet, in DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIPS IN PRACTICE:
ANIMALS IN THE HELPING PROFESSIONS 107, 109 (Phil Arkow ed., 1984); Sally O. Walshaw,
Contemporary Perspectives on Pets and People, in DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIPS IN PRACTICE:
ANIMALS IN THE HELPING PROFESSIONS 37, 43 (Phil Arkow ed., 1984).
46.
See Womack, 135 P.3d at 544.
47.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 597 (West 2010) (creating punishment of imprisonment and/or up to $20,000 fine for malicious and intentional killing or wounding of animal); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a (McKinney 2004) (defining aggravated cruelty to
animals and felony punishment for offense); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6570 (2008) (creating
offense of Class 1 misdemeanor for defined acts of cruelty to animals). Senator Robert Byrd
shared a poignant anecdote of a pet owner’s emotional attachment to her pet during a speech
concerning an action that would help strengthen the Human Slaughter Act. See Robert Byrd,
Speech on the floor of the United States Senate (July 9, 2001) in DAVID FAVRE, ANIMAL
LAW: WELFARE, INTERESTS, AND Rights (2008), at 22-25 (discussing road rage incident
where small dog thrown into traffic following minor traffic collision). The owner of the tenyear old Bichon Frise expressed her relationship with the dog as one of a parent and child.
Road-rage dog killer guilty of cruelty, BBC NEWS (June 19, 2001, 10:19 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1397697.stm (“It wasn’t just a dog . . . for me it was my
child . . . he killed my baby right in front of me.”). See also Audrey Gillan, Road Rage Killer
Dogged by the Call of Justice, WATODAY.COM.AU DRIVE (June 18, 2001),
http://watoday.drive.com.au/motor-news/road-rage-killer-dogged-by-the-call-of-justice20100823-13ho8.html (describing circumstances of incident); 3 Years for Road Rage Dog
Killer,
CBS
NEWS
(July
13,
2001),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/07/12/national/main301135.shtml (describing criminal action for animal cruelty); Man gets 3 years for throwing dog in traffic, CNN.COM (July
13,
2001),
http://articles.cnn.com/2001-07-13/justice/roadrage.dog_1_animal-crueltyandrew-burnett-violent-crime?_s=PM:LAW.
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found and cause the type of emotional injuries for which tort law should
provide a remedy.48
III.

THE JUDICIARY’S FAILURE TO KEEP PACE WITH SOCIETY’S
CHANGING VIEWS

Despite the change in societal attitudes toward companion animals, the
right of human companions to recover for their emotional distress, which
results from the death of their pets, has remained unchanged.49 The law’s
purpose is to adapt to society’s shifting views.50 In the absence of binding
authority, courts have the power to consider underlying public policy as a
basis for their rulings.51 Where there has been a change in public policy,
courts have the power to create new common law and generally do so by
examining the values and viewpoints that are currently important to society.52 Where there has been an overwhelming shift in the public view and
treatment of pets, courts are duty bound to ensure that the law keeps up
with modern society.53 Despite society’s changing attitudes toward compan48.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1965) (recognizing goals of tort
law as compensation, affirmation of societal values and deterrence); see also Key, supra
note 45, at 112; Squires-Lee, supra note 10, at 1064; Kathleen Boyes, When Your Beloved
Pet Dies, You Don’t Have to Grieve Alone, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 1994, § 15, at 1, 4. Focusing
on the goals of tort as stated in the Restatement, Squires-Lee concluded that “[t]he emotional
harms wrought by the death of a companion animal must be recognized if these goals of tort
law are to be fulfilled.” Squires-Lee, supra note 10, at 1064.
49.
See infra notes 67-92 and accompanying text.
50.
Sonia S. Waisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of Non-Economic Damages
for Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion Animals: A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7
ANIMAL L. 45, 73 (2001). “[T]he law is a reflection of norms and values in society. These
norms and values evolve from a complex combination of knowledge bases in society, both
learned and experienced.” Kathy Hessler, The Role of the Animal Law Clinic, 60 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 263, 280 (2010).
51.
See Dan L. McNeil, Judicially Determined Public Policy: Is “The Unruly
Horse” Loose in Michigan?, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 143, 144 (1996) (discussing judicial
lawmaking when judiciary looks to public policy when statutory and constitutional direction
exists).
52.
See Carbasho v. Muslin, 618 S.E.2d 368, 372 (W. Va. 2005) (Starcher, J., dissenting) (characterizing majority opinion as “medieval” and recognizing power of courts to
adjust common law to reflect current needs when common law of the past no longer in harmony with present institutions or societal conditions); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 901 (1965); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus On Remedy, 73
CAL. L. REV. 772, 772 (1985) (stating as one goal of tort law “vindicate[ing] important
societal and personal values”).
53.
See Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (Ohio
1993) (recognizing right of parent to recover damages for loss of filial consortium). The
court relied specifically on the fact that the common law is “ever-evolving” and it had the
duty, absent action by the legislature, “to be certain that the law keeps up with the everchanging needs of a modern society.” Id. See also Kathy Hessler, The Role of the Animal
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ion animals, courts have been reluctant to allow recovery for the emotional
distress which results from the negligent or intentional death of a companion animal.54
Historically, the recovery for the death of a companion animal was
limited to a loss of property claim with damages calculated by the fair market value of the animal.55 In over one hundred years of judicial decisions,
little has changed as courts continue to fall back on the archaic principle
that animals are property, and the sole measure of recovery for damage to
property is its fair market value.56 This fallacy results in human companions
left with minimal, if any, recovery after their pets’ injury or death, because
most companion animals have a negligible market value.57
For a time, the award of damages resulting from the death of a companion animal appeared that it would remain consistent with the rising familial status of companion animals.58 In La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc.,59 the Florida Supreme Court upheld a $1,000 punitive damage
Law Clinic, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 263, 280 (2010) (identifying the possibility “that the legal
analysis of the value of animals in society is flawed, lagging behind that of other significant
parts of society, and should be updated”).
54.
See Carbasho, 618 S.E.2d at 372 (recognizing that nothing prevented majority
from changing common law other than lack of concern for pet owners and emotional bonds
existing between owners and pets); see also infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing
decisions critical of valuing pets beyond market value).
55.
See generally Rebecca J. Huss, The Pervasive Nature of Animal Law: How the
Law Impacts the Lives of People and Their Animal Companions, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1131,
1149-50 (2009) (discussing common law recovery for death of companion animal limited to
fair market value).
56.
See, e.g., Lachenman v. Stice, 838 N.E.2d 451, 467 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he
bottom line is that a dog is personal property, and the measure of damages for the destruction of personal property is the fair market value thereof at the time of the destruction.”);
Monroe v. Lattin, 25 Kan. 251 (1881); Klein v. St. Louis Transit Co., 93 S.W. 281, 283 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1906) (holding jury instruction in error by failing to state measure of damages
calculated by actual value of dog); Schrage v. Hatzlacha Cab Corp., 788 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2004) (holding that there was no recovery for emotional injury following negligent death of dog because dogs are personal property); Jason v. Parks, 638 N.Y.S.2d 170,
171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (noting that it is well established that no recovery allowed for
emotional distress caused by negligent destruction of a dog); Zeid v. Pearce, 953 S.W.2d
368, 369 (Tex. App. 1997) (relying on long-standing rule that recovery for a dog is limited
to market value or special pecuniary value to owner ascertained by reference to dog’s utility
(citing Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex. 1891))).
57.
See Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987) (characterizing pets as personal property similar to heirlooms which generally
have no market value); see also Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Indus., Inc., 131 P.3d 1248, 1251
(Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that a pet’s monetary value is “usually close to zero” (quoting
Margit Livingston, The Calculus of Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy, 82 NEB.
L. REV. 783, 847 (2004))).
58.
See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
59.
La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964).
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jury award to the owner of Heidi, a miniature dachshund, after a garbage
collector maliciously, and with extreme indifference, hurled an empty trash
can at her and killed her.60 The LaPorte court expressly declined to limit
damages to the pet’s market value.61 The court stopped short, however, of
analogizing the human animal bond to that of parent and child even though
it expressly recognized that the “affection of a master for his dog is a very
real thing,” and recovery should be allowed irrespective of fair market
value.62
Years later, a New York court expressly renounced the characterization of a dog as a piece of personal property.63 The defendant euthanized a
dog but failed to turn over its body, instead placing a cat in the casket, causing severe mental and emotional distress to the dog’s owner.64 In awarding
damages above the dog’s market value, the court rejected the historic rule
that animals are property, stating “a pet is not just a thing but occupies a
special place somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal property.”65
Courts were taking notice of America’s changing attitude towards
companion animals.66 The more companion animals became integrated into
the family structure, the further courts were willing to go when awarding

60.
Id. at 268.
61.
Id. at 269.
62.
Id.
63.
See Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1979) (“To say [a dog] is a piece of personal property and no more is a repudiation
of our humaneness.”).
64.
Id. Crawford planned an elaborate funeral for her fifteen year old poodle including a headstone and attendance by Crawford’s family and friends. She also planned to visit
the grave following the funeral.
65.
Id. (awarding damages for mental anguish and despondency caused by wrongful
destruction and loss of dog’s body). Importantly, the court found a pet to be distinct from an
inanimate object that simply receives affection, because it returns the affection. See id. (noting decision should not be construed to include award for loss of family heirloom that causes
great mental anguish).
66.
See Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw. 1981)
(awarding emotional damages resulting from death of family dog question of fact for jury);
Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 564 (Tex. App. 2004) (“[T]here
are myriad examples that Texans today view dogs more as companions, friends, or even
something akin to family than as an economic tool or benefit.”); Bueckner v. Hamel, 886
S.W.2d 368, 373 (Tex. App. 1994) (Andell, J., concurring) (considering general market
value rule as inadequate when assessing damages for loss of a domestic pet); see also Sonia
S. Waisman, Non-Economic Damages: Where Does It Get Us and How Do We Get There?,
1 J. ANIMAL L. 7, 9-10 (2005) (discussing argument that increase in number of judicial opinions acknowledging companion animals as different than inanimate property will result in
increased acceptance within legal system and society).
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damages for the human companion’s emotional suffering.67 Recovery for
the loss of a companion animal seemed poised to follow a similar course as
that for loss of a child.68 As the societal role of companion animals continued to evolve, however, the judiciary inexplicably stopped keeping pace.69
The decisions that characterized animals as “more than property” were
denounced as aberrations and criticized for lacking precedent to support
their conclusions.70 Courts regressed to valuing companion animals as they
67.
See, e.g., Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2001) (predicting that Pennsylvania courts would allow jury to award damages for intentional infliction
of emotional distress where “the malicious behavior is directed to the owner as well as to the
pet”); Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985) (recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action because loss of pet can be
especially distressing in egregious situations); Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1985) (allowing claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress when the negligent or reckless killing of donkey caused extreme mental anguish and suffering); Jankoski v.
Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (allowing sentimental value to be considered when assessing actual value of pet); City of Garland v. White, 368
S.W.2d 12, 17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (holding that evidence of plaintiff’s mental and emotional suffering sufficient to sustain award for wrongful killing of a dog); Womack v. Von
Rardon, 135 P.3d 542, 546 (Wash. 2006) (holding in a case of first impression that malicious
injury to a pet may support a claim for emotional distress damages).
68.
See Anzalone v. Kragness, 826 N.E.2d 472, 476 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (recognizing as creature of statute the right to recover for loss of companionship of child and drawing
analogy between loss of child and loss of companion animal); Carbasho v. Muslin, 618
S.E.2d 368, 372 (W. Va. 2005) (Starcher, J., dissenting) (“[L]ike the children of the preindustrial revolution, the majority opinion chooses to categorize those pets as nothing more
than chattel.”). Compensation for loss of the companionship of a child was not traditionally
recognized by the common law. The damages a surviving parent could recover for the intentional or negligent killing of a child were “limited to the pecuniary value of the child’s services and financial contributions, minus the cost of his care, support and education.” Sanchez
v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983). The common law rule many courts used to
deny a parent the right to recover for their child’s society and companionship originated
when children were treated as servants. Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Wis.
1975). Judicial decisions changed as the role children played in the household changed: the
companionship children provided was more representative of their significance than their
financial contributions. See First Trust Co. of N.D. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, Inc.,
429 N.W.2d 5, 10-11 (N.D. 1988). Today, the majority of jurisdictions, whether by common
law or statute, allow parents to recover for the society and companionship of their child.
Todd R. Smyth, Annotation, Parent’s right to recover for loss of consortium in connection
with injury to child, 54 A.L.R. (4th) 112 (1987).
69.
See Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App.
2000) (noting pets have evolved in modern society to status not consistent with the characterization as chattel but case law remains inconsistent and unpersuasive when considering
public policy and societal sentiment on treatment of pets).
70.
See Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y 1994)
(characterizing Corso and opinions following it as “aberrations flying in face of overwhelming authority to the contrary.”); Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785
N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (denying plaintiffs’ claim for loss of consortium and
declining to follow Corso because it contradicts legislature’s characterization of dogs as
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had in the nineteenth century.71 When calculating damages for a dislocated
hip suffered by a Yorkshire Terrier, a Kansas court sought guidance from a
one-hundred and twenty-five year old decision involving a runaway working horse and buggy.72 Similarly, in calculating damages for the death of a
toy poodle the Sherman v. Kissinger73 court relied on a then forty-two year
old opinion for the measure of damages for loss of property.74 The court did
not expressly limit the damages to market value, instead holding that where
a piece of property cannot “be reproduced or replaced, then its value to the
owner may be considered in fixing damages.”75 The Sherman court, howproperty); see also Lachenman v. Stice, 838 N.E.2d 451, 467 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he
bottom line is that a dog is personal property, and the measure of damages for the destruction of personal property is the fair market value thereof at the time of the destruction.”);
Schrage v. Hatzlacha Cab Corp., 788 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding that
there was no recovery for emotional injury following negligent death of dog because dogs
defined as personal property); Jason v. Parks, 638 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(noting that it is well established that there is no recovery for emotional distress caused by
the negligent destruction of a dog); Zeid v. Pearce, 953 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. App. 1997)
(relying on Texas rule that recovery for a dog is limited to the market value or special pecuniary value to the owner, ascertained by reference to the dog’s utility (citing Heiligmann v.
Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex. 1891))).
71.
See, e.g., Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Indus., Inc., 131 P.3d 1248, 1251-52 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2006) (relying on 1881 opinion) (citing Monroe v. Lattin, 25 Kan. 251 (1881)));
Zeid, 953 S.W.2d at 369 (relying on 1891 opinion) (citing Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931
(Tex. 1891))).
72.
See Burgess, 131 P.3d at 1252 (recognizing difficulty and potential impossibility to determine value of dog in purely economic market value terms). While recognizing
that a horse for hire is conducive to an economic valuation more easily than a Yorkshire
Terrier companion animal, the Burgess court followed the market-value approach and limited recovery to the amount spent on veterinary bills. Id. at 1252-53. In contrast, the Supreme Court of Vermont refused to apply the state’s lost property statute dating from the
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries to a replevin action concerning a lost dog.
Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630, 632-33 (Vt. 1997) (noting value of dog is primarily emotional and not financial and “derives from the animal’s relationship with its human companions.”) (emphasis in original).
73.
Sherman v. Kissinger, 195 P.3d 539 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
74.
Id. at 547-48 (citing McCurdy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 413 P.2d 617 (Wash.
1966)).
75.
Id. at 547 (quoting McCurdy, 413 P.2d at 623). Fifteen years earlier, an Ohio
court calculating damages for a prize show dog, articulated a similar standard:
Market value is the standard which the courts insist on as a measure of
direct property loss, where it is available, but that is a standard not a
shackle. When market value cannot be feasibly obtained, a more elastic
standard is resorted to, sometimes called the standard of value to the
owner. This doctrine is a recognition that property may have value to the
owner in exceptional circumstances which is the basis of a better standard than what the article would bring in the open market.
McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 750, 752 (Ohio 1994) (quoting
Bishop v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 56 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ohio 1944)). Like the Sherman court, the
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ever, narrowly defined value to the owner by excluding consideration of
“sentimental or fanciful value.”76 Under Sherman and similar cases, when
assessing value to the owner a jury is not bound by the owner’s testimony
and may be guided by the dog’s utility.77 In effect, the human companion is
left with minimal, if any, recovery.78
This apparent back-peddling by the courts was not for lack of judicial
recognition of the familial status that companion animals had achieved.79
McDonald court similarly declined to include sentimentality in what it defined as “a more
elastic standard.” McDonald, 644 N.E.2d at 752.
76.
Sherman, 195 P.3d at 547 (citing Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 593 P.2d 1308
(Wash. 1979)). In doing so, the court affirmed prior decisions holding that “a pet owner has
no right of emotional distress damages or damages for loss of human-animal bond based on
negligent death or injury to a pet.” Sherman, 195 P.3d at 548 (holding that a pet owner is not
entitled to damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of companionship or
the guardian-companion animal relationship where her small dog was mauled and injured by
Rottweiler dogs (citing Pickford v. Masion 98 P.3d 1232, 1235 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004))). See
Brinton v. Codoni, No. 59956-9-I, 2009 WL 297006, at *2 n.5 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 9,
2009) (following the Sherman ruling that intrinsic value does not include “sentimental
value,” and limiting recovery to fair market value where neighbors dog entered the yard and
killed plaintiff’s dog); see also Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Amber E. Dean, Veterinarians in the
Doghouse: Are Pet Suits Economically Viable?, THE BRIEF, Spring 2002, at 46-47 (recognizing that while some courts may differ as to whether market value or actual value is the appropriate measure of damages, the majority of courts do not allow human companions to
recover sentimental value).
77.
Sherman, 195 P.3d at 548 (citing Stephens v. Target Corp., 482 F. Supp. 2d
1234 (9th Cir. 2007)).
78.
See Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987) (recognizing that the “concept of actual value to the owner may include some
element of sentimental value in order to avoid limiting” recovery to nominal damages but
holding that damages severely circumscribed because recovery for loss of companionship of
dog not permitted in Illinois); Carbasho v. Muslin, 618 S.E.2d 368, 371 (W. Va. 2005)
(holding that damages for sentimental value or mental suffering are not recoverable for death
of dog). But see Womack v. Von Rardon, 135 P.3d 542, 546 (Wash. 2006) (awarding $5,000
in damages for emotional distress where neighborhood children set cat on fire because the
conduct amounted to more than negligence, and thereby supported award).
79.
See Petco Animal Supplies v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 564 (Tex. App. 2004)
(“[T]here are myriad examples that Texans today view dogs more as companions, friends, or
even something akin to family than as an economic tool or benefit.”). A California judge
best summarized how essential companion animals have become to the family unit:
[T]he value of pets in daily life is a matter of common knowledge and
understanding as well as extensive documentation. People of all ages,
but particularly the elderly and the young, enjoy their companionship.
Those who suffer from serious disease or injury and are confined to their
home or bed experience a therapeutic, even spiritual, benefit from their
presence. Animals provide comfort at the death of a family member or
dear friend, and for the lonely can offer a reason for living when life
seems to have lost its meaning. . . . Single adults may find certain pets
can afford a feeling of security. Families benefit from the experience of
sharing that having a pet encourages. While pet ownership may not be a
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Decisions continue to recognize the prominent role played by companion
animals in the hearts and homes of their human companions, even as they
reluctantly decline to extend the recovery of emotional damages accordingly.80 Judicial frustration with the “emotionless economic calculus of
fundamental right as such, unquestionably it is an integral aspect of our
daily existence . . . .
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1295 (Cal. 1994) (Arabian, J.,
dissenting).
80.
See, e.g., Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 1996) (declining to allow damages for mental distress even though mindful of the suffering owners endure
upon death or injury of a beloved pet); Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Indus., Inc., 131 P.3d
1248, 1250 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (allowing damages only for veterinary bills); Strawser v.
Wright, 610 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (sympathizing with pain owner endures
upon the death of companion animal but denying recovery for loss of property); Morgan v.
Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630, 633 (Vt. 1997) (noting a pet’s value derives from its relationship
with human companions); See also Zager v. Dimilia, 524 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (N.Y. Vill. Ct.
1988) (holding the proper measure of damages is the reasonable and necessary cost of veterinary treatment because too difficult to calculate ethereal intrinsic value for pet); Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 629 S.E.2d 181, 186-87 (Va. 2006) (holding recovery is limited to
diminution of value of a pet because of it status at law as personal property); Rabideau v.
City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001) (recognizing the long-standing association
between dog and human but limiting recovery due to the law’s characterization of a dog as
personal property). The Zager, Kondaurov, and Rabideau courts highlighted the special
relationship between an owner and a pet, however, each were constrained by the classification of a pet as personal property. Specifically, Zager stated:
[a pet’s] relationship to [his owner] and members of his family does
have value separate and distinct from sentiment, [but this is] an element
which the law precludes from consideration in ascertaining damages.
However, it is impossible to reduce to monetary terms the bond between
man and dog, a relationship which has been more eloquently memorialized in literature and depicted on the motion picture screen.
524 N.Y.S.2d at 969 (citations omitted). Similarly, the Rabideau court noted that a description of a dog as mere personal property fails to recognize the value placed by owners on
their companionship with their dogs: “A companion dog is not a fungible item, equivalent to
other items of personal property. A companion dog is not a living room sofa or dining room
furniture. This term inadequately and inaccurately describes the relationship between a human and a dog.” 627 N.W.2d at 798. Although courts recognized the sentimental attachment
human companions have toward their companion animals, they continued to hold that this
attachment does not make the animals unique pieces of chattel under the law. See Daughen
v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 864 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). This sentiment was echoed by the Supreme
Court of Virginia:
It is beyond debate that animals, particularly dogs and cats, when kept as
pets and companions, occupy a position in human affections far removed
from livestock. Especially in the case of owners who are disabled, aged
or lonely, an emotional bond may exist with a pet resembling that between parent and child, and the loss of such an animal may give rise to
grief approaching that attending the loss of a family member. The fact
remains, however, that the law in Virginia, as in most states that have
decided the question, regards animals, however beloved, as personal
property.
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property law” as applied to companion animals is demonstrated by the text
of recent decisions.81 In Scheele v. Dustin,82 the Vermont Supreme Court
declined to allow recovery beyond $155 of economic damages for the malicious killing of a family dog with a pellet gun.83 When declining to permit
recovery for the human companion’s emotional suffering, the court relied
on the legislature’s province to shape the law that governs the treatment of
animals.84 The court acknowledged that issues concerning a human companion’s recovery for emotional damages—including loss of companion-

Kondaurov, 629 S.E.2d at 186-87.
81.
Scheele v. Dustin, 998 A.2d 697, 700 (Vt. 2010) (summarizing past decisions);
See also Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003) (Young, J., concurring) (agreeing reluctantly that pet owners may not recover
non-economic damages for injuries to pet but suggesting that “[t]he General Assembly
should at least consider recognizing pets as companion animals and allow owners to recover
reasonable damages for their loss of or injury to a much-loved pet.”). The Scheele court
stated:
[C]ategorizing a beloved pet as mere property fails to recognize that
such an animal’s worth is not primarily financial[;] . . . its value derives
from the animal’s relationship with its human companions. Indeed, we
have suggested that the emotionless economic calculus of property law
may not fully compensate a mourning pet owner. . . .
Scheele, 998 A.2d at 700 (first ellipses in original) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation
omitted). Judicial frustration with the current state of the common law has been expressed,
particularly well, by one Connecticut court:
Labeling a pet as property fails to describe the emotional value human
beings place on the companionship that they enjoy with such an animal.
Although dogs are considered property . . . this term inadequately and
inaccurately describes the relationship between an individual and his or
her pet. That having been said, there is no common-law authority in this
state that allows plaintiffs to recover noneconomic damages resulting
from a defendant’s alleged negligent or intentional act resulting in the
death of a pet. . . .
Myers v. Hartford, 853 A.2d 621, 626 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). Animal law scholars have also
voiced their dissatisfaction with the inadequate calculation of damages when animals are
characterized as property:
The “animals as property” syllogism arbitrarily, irrationally, unfairly,
and formalistically limits recovery of noneconomic damages for the
wrongful deaths of companion animals. It ignores the fact that the relationship between a human and his companion animal is no more based
upon economics than is any other family relationship. It perversely permits the award of damages for an economic loss that a human companion does not suffer and refuses to compensate for the emotional distress
and loss of society and companionship that he actually does suffer.
Wise, supra note 44, at 93.
82.
Scheele, 998 A.2d 697 (Vt. 2010).
83.
Id. at 698-99.
84.
Id. at 704 (citing Goodby v. Vetpharm, Inc., 974 A.2d 1269 (Vt. 2009)).
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ship—would best be presented to the legislature.85 Absent action by the
legislature, the court was left to rely on outdated precedent that categorized
a companion animal as property for which the sole measure of damages is
its fair market value.86 Following Scheele, other courts have similarly noted
that it is the task of the legislature to expand recovery for loss of a pet.87
In addition to citing a lack of precedent supporting recovery of noneconomic damages, some courts express concern about permitting damage
awards fearing that, once allowed, there would be no clear or reasonable
point to limit recovery—by animal class or amount of recovery.88 In John85.
Id. (recognizing the duty of the legislature to shape body of law regarding animals and duty of courts to look to that body of law for guidance). The Scheele court also
recognized that the Vermont legislature has previously enacted legislation for the recovery
of specific damages for the destruction of property and, therefore, has the power to do the
same for animals. Id. at 703 n.4 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3606 (West 2010) (allowing
for the recovery of treble damages for conversion of a tree)).
86.
See Scheele, 998 A.2d at 704; see also A.2711-Memorandum in Support of
Legislation
(Apr.
13,
2009),
232nd
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(N.Y.
2009),
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A02711&term=2009&Memo=Y&Text=Y
(discussing the need for New York to enact statute allowing recovery for emotional injuries).
The bill’s justification included specific reference to courts departing from the traditional
concept of animals as property:
Brutal violence against animals, so often a precursor to violence against
humans, goes on largely undeterred - and entirely uncompensated . . .
our civil tort law still treats animals the same as inanimate property: like
table and chairs. Although several courts in New York have departed
from the traditional approach, many are hesitant, absent legislative guidance, to relinquish the common law’s antiquated, scientifically obsolete
assumption that animals are just “things.”
Id.
87.
See Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App.
2000) (failing to find Michigan precedent that would allow for the recovery of emotional
injuries suffered for the loss of a pet, and deferring to the legislature to create such a remedy); Goodby v. Vetpharm, Inc., 974 A.2d 1269, 1274 (Vt. 2009) (lacking a compelling
reason to usurp the role of the legislature and expanding the common law to allow for recovery of mental anguish for the loss of a pet). See also infra note 101 (quoting Justice Abrahamson’s concurring opinion in Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d 789 (Wis. 2001)); Shadoan v. Barnett, 289 S.W. 204, 206 (Ky. 1926) (conceding within legislature’s police powers to enact
laws governing dogs).
88.
See Lachenman v. Stice, 838 N.E.2d 451, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (equating
the loss of pet dog to lost heirlooms and photos and holding that these economic losses do
not support claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Pacher v. Invisible Fence of
Dayton, 798 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting recovery of emotional damages due to the difficulty to define classes entitled to recovery and animal classes for which
recovery allowed); Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Wis. 2001) (fearing
allowing recovery for loss of dog would extend ad infinitum because of inability to rationally
distinguish other categories of companionship). Courts have expressed concern about quantifying the emotional value of a pet and increasing potential burdens on the court system. See
Myers v. Hartford, 853 A.2d 621, 626 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (citing public policy concerns
related to “flooding the courts with spurious and fraudulent claims” when affirming common
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son v. Douglas,89 the plaintiffs were walking their dogs when the defendant,
allegedly driving her vehicle at an excessive rate of speed, crushed one of
the dogs.90 When denying the plaintiffs’ claims for emotional distress, the
court conceded that many pet owners consider their pets members of the
family.91 Although the court sympathized with the plaintiffs and acknowledged how traumatic it must have been for them to witness the death of a
family dog, the court declined to extend recovery for emotional damages
for the destruction of property—even when the property is a living, breathing, and loving dog.92 The court theorized and feared that allowing these
claims for pets would necessarily cause an extension of claims for the tortious destruction of other types of property such as family heirlooms or
prized possessions.93
Courts find their hands tied, lacking the precedent on which they may
base recovery for emotional damages.94 Scholars have similarly recognized
this impasse many courts have reached.95 Even as courts recognize a need
law denial of emotional damages for death of a pet). But see Campbell v. Animal Quarantine
Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw. 1981) (noting that the Rodrigues decision permitted
recovery for mental distress suffered following negligent destruction of property but that a
floodgate of similar cases has not opened in ten years following decision (citing Rodrigues
v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (1970))); Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (Sup. Ct.
1980) (noting uncertain damages or lack of absolute mathematical accuracy should not be a
bar to recovery). Courts rejected similar arguments that were raised in the context of filial
consortium claims. See Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1058
(Ohio 1993) (ruling “difficulty in measuring damages for a parent’s loss of filial consortium
is no justification for denying the right to pursue the claim.”).
89.
Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
90.
Id. at 627.
91.
Id. at 628.
92.
Id. (“Although we live in a particularly litigious society, the court is not about to
recognize a tortious cause of action to recover for emotional distress due to the death of a
family pet.”).
93.
Id.
94.
See, e.g., Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App.
2000) (“Case law on this issue from sister states is not consistent, persuasive, or sufficient
precedent. We refuse to create a remedy where there is no legal structure in which to give it
support.”); Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 565 (Tex. Ct. App.
2004) (reversing trial court’s $47,000 damage award when $10,000 of award was attributed
to emotional damages and loss of companionship after finding no support for awarding
mental anguish damages for loss of dog under Texas law); Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 629
S.E.2d 181, 186-87 (Va. 2006) (specifically stating that Virginia law considers animals as
personal property no matter how beloved and changing); Mansour v. King Country, 128
P.3d 1241, 1247 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (“[A]lthough we have recognized the emotional
importance of pets to their families, legally they remain . . . property.”). The Petco court
recognized that it was bound by precedent—or lack thereof—stating “[a]s an intermediate
appellate court, we are not free to mold Texas law as we see fit but must instead follow the
precedents of the Texas Supreme Court unless and until the high court overrules them or the
Texas Legislature supersedes them by statute.” Petco, 144 S.W.3d at 565.
95.
See Waisman & Newell supra note 50, at 68.
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for the recovery of emotional damages, courts consider their hands to be
tied because they lack the precedent on which they may base recovery for
emotional damages. This impasse has a plain solution: state legislators must
take action and change the law of recoverable damages.96
IV.

THE T-BO ACT AND ITS PROGENY: EXISTING AND PROPOSED
LEGISLATION

In the past decade, three states have enacted statutes expressly permitting non-economic damages for the loss of a pet.97 The statutes share a
similar framework with each defining what constitutes a “companion animal” or “pet,” the actionable tortious conduct, recoverable damages, and
parties exempt from liability.98 There are also dramatic differences among
the statutes, but the grants and limitations imposed by each may be instructive to the legislatures of other states contemplating a statute that recognizes
the unique position of companion animals.99
The time clearly has come for legislatures to step in to guide the courts
and memorialize by statute what most professionals and companions to
animals already know—animals are now clearly and unequivocally
members of the family to many individuals who suffer (psychologically
and possibly physically as well) at their loss. Where harm to one’s animal companion is the result of the intentional or negligent act of another,
the damages must reflect the depth and scope of the loss—as with any
other wrongful death or loss of companionship claim.
Id. See also Victor E. Schwartz & Emily J. Laird, Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation:
The Serious Need To Preserve A Rational Rule, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 227, 243 (2006) (“[I]t is
clear that when courts allow non-economic damages in pet cases, they undertake fundamental changes to the common law that are better left to the legislature.”).
96.
See Anzalone v. Kragness, 826 N.E.2d 472, 476 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (deferring
to legislature to fashion an appropriate cause of action and provide guidance about appropriate measure of damages); Kransnecky v. Meffen, 777 N.E.2d 1286 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002)
(holding that in absence of statutory authority recovery for loss of consortium for death of
sheep precluded such recovery); Koester, 624 N.W.2d at 211 (“We refuse to create a remedy
where there is no legal structure in which to give it support. However, plaintiff and others
are free to urge the Legislature to visit this issue in light of public policy considerations,
including societal sentiment and treatment of pets. . . .”); Kondaurov, 629 S.E.2d at 187
(recognizing that change in law of damages is a subject matter properly left to legislative
consideration); infra note 85 and accompanying text (recognizing role of legislature).
97.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-351a (2009) (originally enacted in 2004); 510 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 70/16.3 (2010) (originally enacted in 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403
(West 2010) (originally enacted 2000).
98.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-351a (2009); 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/16.3 (2010);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (West 2010); see also LITIGATING ANIMAL LAW DISPUTES A
COMPLETE GUIDE FOR LAWYERS 446-47 (Joan Schaffner & Julie Freshtman eds., 2009).
99.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-351a (2009); 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/16.3 (2010);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (West 2010); see also infra notes 103-122 and accompanying text (describing provisions and limitations of statutes).
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EXISTING LEGISLATION

Tennessee was the first state to adopt a statute expressly authorizing
the recovery of non-economic damages for the death of a companion animal.100 Shortly after its codification, one court commented that this is the
way non-economic damages for death or injury to a companion animal
should be handled.101 Commonly referred to as the “T-Bo Act,”102 the statute was enacted to compensate the human companion upon the unlawful,
intentional, or negligent act “of another or animal of another.”103 The Tennessee statute uses the term “pet” and applies to “domesticated dog[s] or
cat[s] normally maintained in or near the household of [their] owner.”104 It
permits recovery for non-economic damages related to “the loss of the reasonably expected society, companionship, love and affection of the pet.”105
When enacting the T-Bo Act, the Tennessee legislature recognized that
emotional distress and loss of companionship are appropriate forms of relief
following the intentional or negligent killing of a companion animal and, at
least implicitly, adopted society’s view that companion animals occupy a
special place in the family structure.106
The T-Bo Act, while a step in the right direction, is not an ideal solution. The form of recovery created by the statute does not apply when a
human companion brings a professional negligence action against a licensed veterinarian.107 Similarly, non-profit groups, governmental agencies,
and the employees of each are expressly exempt from liability when they
100.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (West 2010).
101.
See Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 807 (Wis. 2001) (Abrahamson, J., concurring). Justice Abrahamson praised the legislature for acting:
At least one state has enacted a law that allows up to $4,000 recovery for
non-economic damages such as loss of the reasonably expected companionship, love, and affection of a pet resulting from the intentional or negligent killing of the pet. Such a statute allows the legislature to make a
considered policy judgment regarding the societal value of pets as companions and to specify the nature of the damages to be awarded in a lawsuit.
Id.
102.
SONIA WAISMAN, PAMELA FRASCH & BRUCE WAGMAN, ANIMAL LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS 77 (3d ed. 2006). Tennessee Senator Steve Cohen proposed the bill after his
Shitzu, T-Bo, was wrongfully killed by another dog. See Paek, supra note 36, at 517. Senator Cohen sued in small claims court and was only allowed to recover T-Bo’s medical expenses. Id. The Senator was unable to bring a claim based on his emotional distress caused
by T-Bo’s death because companion animals were considered property. Id. at 517-18.
103.
TENN. CODE ANN. §44-17-403(a)(1) (West 2010).
104.
Id. § 44-17-403(b).
105.
Id. § 44-17-403(d).
106.
See id.; see also supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing integration of companion animals into family).
107.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(e) (West 2010).
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are acting in their professional capacity on behalf of the public health or
animal welfare.108 The statute places a $5,000 cap on recovery for the loss
of the pet’s companionship, love, and affection.109 Recovery is further restricted when negligence is the cause of the pet’s death or injury—it must
occur on the human companion’s property or while the pet was under the
human companion’s control and supervision.110
The Illinois statute—codified two years after the T-Bo Act—provides
for broader recovery by human companions, but limits the availability of a
cause of action.111 A successful claim must allege that the putative defendant subjected the companion animal to an act of aggravated cruelty or torture, or engaged in bad faith that resulted in the companion animal’s injury
or death.112 Unlike the T-Bo Act, in Illinois a human companion may recover for any animal to which a person has a right of ownership—recovery
is not limited to dogs and cats.113 Illinois permits recovery for a broad array
of actual damages and permits the award of punitive damages of not less
than $500, but not more than $25,000 for each act of abuse or neglect suffered by the animal.114 The punitive damage provision of the Illinois statute,
alone, allows for the potential recovery of up to five times the T-Bo Act’s
cap on damages for one injurious act committed by a third-party.115 A further benefit offered by the Illinois statute is the mandatory award of attorney’s fees and costs actually incurred by the human companion when
prosecuting his claim.116 Further expanding the availability of recovery, the
Illinois legislature did not expressly exempt any specific agency or individual from liability under the section.117
The most recently enacted statute, in Connecticut, is in some ways the
most restrictive.118 Like the T-Bo Act, it limits its application to domesti-

108.
Id.
109.
Id. § 44-17-403.
110.
Id. § 44-17-403(a)(1).
111.
See 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/16.3 (2010).
112.
Id.
113.
Compare id. (applying to any person with right of ownership in an animal), with
TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(b) (West 2010) (defining pet as domesticated dog or cat).
114.
See 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/16.3 (2010) (describing damages sustained by
human companion). Damages are defined by the statute to include, but not be limited to, the
animal’s monetary value, incurred veterinary expenses, expenses incurred rectifying effect
of cruelty pain and suffering of the animal and expenses incurred rectifying emotional distress suffered by human companion. Id.
115.
Compare id. (describing punitive damage awards), with TENN. CODE ANN. §4417-403(a) (West 2010) (limiting recovery for non-economic damages to $5,000).
116.
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/16.3 (2010).
117.
See id.
118.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-351a (2009).
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cated dogs and cats normally kept in or near households.119 It further limits
recovery by imposing liability only after the intentional killing or injuring
of a companion animal.120 The statute does not provide for non-economic
damages suffered by the human companion, but identifies the types of economic damages that may be recovered and provides for the award of punitive damages.121 Although attorney’s fees are awarded as of right in Illinois,
a Connecticut court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing
human companion.122 Further limiting the recovery available to human
companions, Connecticut does not permit an award of punitive damages or
attorney’s fees against certain broad classes of defendants.123
B.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

In the ten years since the first of these statutes was enacted, many
states have attempted to pass legislation similar to the T-Bo Act and its
progeny.124 In 2009, at least six states proposed bills related to expanding
119.
Id. (defining companion animal); see also supra note 104 and accompanying
text (describing pet as defined by T-Bo Act).
120.
Id.
121.
See id. (stating economic damages recoverable include but not limited to veterinary care, fair monetary value of companion animal and burial expenses); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 22-351a(c) (2009) (limiting award of punitive damages to the jurisdictional monetary limit
established in small claims proceedings). In 2009 Connecticut declined to enact additional
legislation that would have increased owner liability for damages caused by a dog. The
favorable report from the Environmental Committee provides guidance concerning the explanation of the failure to enact the legislation with its summary of the opposition: “If we
begin enumerating the types of items covered pursuant to the statute, the statute will likely
have to be amended to provide the same for any and all potential damaged subjects of the
statue [sic].” CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. ENVTL. COMM., JOINT FAVORABLE REP., S.B. 743 (2009),
available at www.cga.ct.gov/2009/JFR/S/2009SB-00743-R00ENV-JFR.htm.
122.
Compare 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/16.3 (2010) (“[T]he court must award reasonable attorney’s fees”), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-351a(c) (2009) (“[T]he court may
award . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.”).
123.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-351a(c)-(d) (2009). Licensed veterinarians, the state or
state employee acting within his capacity, and employees or volunteers of non-profits operated for the prevention of cruelty to animals are exempt from punitive damages and attorney
fees. Id. § 22-351a(d) (2009).
124.
See Elaine T. Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful Death
Cases: A Survey of Current Court and Legislative Action and a Suggestion for Valuing
Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 215, 226-30 (2003) (discussing Tennessee’s
T-Bo Act and surveying proposed legislation in other states). But see NEV. REV. STAT. §
41.740 (2007) (expressly precluding punitive and non-economic damages for intentionally,
willfully, recklessly or negligently injuring or killing the pet of another). The development
of pet trusts provides further evidence of the rising familial status of companion animals. See
Susan J. Hankin, Not A Living Room Sofa: Changing the Legal Status of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 314, 358-65 (2007) (discussing growing number of
jurisdictions adopting legislation that permits creation of binding pet trusts to provide for
care of companion animals after death of human companion). When Hankin’s article was
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damages recoverable for death or injury to a companion animal.125 All but
one of these proposed bills have been quietly rejected by the state’s legislatures.126 The existence of these bills, however, provide guidance as these

published in 2007, twenty-six states had enacted binding pet trust statutes. Id. at 363. As of
early 2011, the number of states permitting pet trusts had increased to 44. Pet Trusts,
ANIMAL
LEGAL
&
HISTORICAL
CENTER,
http://www.animallaw.info/articles/armpuspettrusts.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). Further
evidence of legislatures recognizing the changing status of companion animals can be found
by codes, county ordinances and legislation that use the term “guardian” instead of “owner”
when referring to companion animals. See Guardian Communities, THE GUARDIAN
CAMPAIGN, http://www.guardiancampaign.com/guardiancity.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
As of 2008, the state of Rhode Island and eighteen cities and counties across the United
States have incorporated the term “guardian” into their animal-related ordinances. Id. In
Defense of Animals created the Guardian Campaign in 1999 and promotes using the term
“guardian” because the term more accurately connotes the responsibility for the care, welfare, treatment and quality of life of the animal. See Benefits of the Guardian Language, THE
GUARDIAN CAMPAIGN, http://www.guardiancampaign.com/guardianlanguage.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2011) (recognizing term does not change animal’s legal status).
125.
See S.743, 2009 Conn. Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (2009), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/TOB/s/pdf/2009SB-00743-R00-SB.pdf; S.743-25, Reg. Sess., at
1 (Haw. 2009), available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2009/bills/SB73_.pdf;
S.1550-186, Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess., at 2-4 (Mass. 2009), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1550; S.B.1689-186, Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess., at
2-4 (Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1689;
H.1250186, Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess., at 2 (Mass. 2009), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/House/H1250; H.1309-186, Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess., at 2
(Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/House/H1309; A.2711232,
Reg.
Sess.,
at
1-2
(N.Y.
2009),
available
at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?sh=printbill&bn=A02711&term=2009; H.2209-52, 1st Sess.,
at 3-4 (Okla. 2009), available at http://www.oklegislature.gov/AdvancedSearchForm.aspx;
H.1150-61,
Reg.
Sess.
at
1-2
(Wash.
2009),
available
at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2009-10/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1150.pdf; See
also S.838, 75th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009), available at
http://www.leg.state.or.us/09reg/measpdf/sb0800.dir/sb0838.intro.pdf (proposing legislation
to create crime of hindering assistance animals as defined by existing Oregon law).
126.
Washington House Bill 1150 passed favorably through the Judiciary Committee
in early 2009. It was re-introduced in the same status during the 2010 regular session and the
2010 1st Special Session. See History of Bill, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE (Jan. 9, 2011 2:11
PM), http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/summary.aspx?bill=1150&year=2009. House Bill 1150
is the most restrictive of the proposed bills—allowing only for the recovery of exemplary
damages, up to three times actual damages, and attorney’s fees. H.1150-61, Reg. Sess. at 1-2
(Wash.
2009),
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/200910/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1150.pdf. The Judiciary Committee Bill Analysis provides little
guidance concerning the type of damages that would constitute actual damages for the injury
or death of a companion animal, because Washington law characterizes pets as personal
property for which a jury may not consider its sentimental value. See Courtney Barnes, Bill
Analysis HB 1150, JUDICIARY COMM. WASH. STATE H.R. OFFICE OF PROGRAM RESEARCH,
available
at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/200910/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/1150%20JUDI%2009.pdf; see also supra notes 73-77 and
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states, and others, continue to struggle with the unique and evolving position of companion animals in society as they attempt to codify right to recover non-economic damages.
Currently, Hawaii precludes recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress if the distress arises from the destruction of personal property.127 The proposed bill would have amended the statutory language limiting recovery of emotional damages for the destruction of personal property
to expressly exclude domestic animals maintained solely for personal enjoyment and companionship.128 The amendment would have limited recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress suffered by the owner of a
companion animal as a result of injury to the domestic animal to $25,000.129
In Massachusetts, four proposals were presented to the House and
Senate, two seeking to amend an existing statute to expressly allow for the
recovery of damages for wrongful injury or death to a companion animal,
and two seeking to allow recovery of non-economic damages for malicious
injury to pets.130 Senate Bills 1550 and 1689 defined an “animalcompanion” to include “dog[s], cat[s] or any warm-blooded, domesticated
non-human animal dependent on one or more human persons for food, shelter, veterinary care, or companionship.”131 Perhaps the most expansive of
accompanying text (discussing Washington court opinion excluding consideration of sentimental value when calculating value of toy poodle).
127.
HAW. REV. STAT. §663-8.9(a) (2007). See Campbell v. Animal Quarantine
Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw. 1981) (classifying pets as personal property).
128.
S.73-25,
Reg.
Sess.
(Haw.
2009),
available
at
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2009/bills/SB73_.pdf. (defining domestic animals as,
“dogs, cats, rabbits, birds, and other beasts which are maintained on the premise of a dwelling unit and kept by the resident . . . solely for personal enjoyment and companionship . . .
.”)
129.
Id. The bill passed its first reading in May 2009 before being carried over to the
2010 Regular Session where it was not acted upon or carried over to the 2011 Regular Session. See SB73 Measure History, HAW. STATE LEG., 2009 Reg. Sess. (last visited Jan. 9,
2011),
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2009/lists/measure_indiv.aspx?billtype=
SB&billnumber=73.
130.
S. 1550-186, Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess., at 2-4 (Mass. 2009), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1550 (seeking to amend General Laws
chapter 272 section 85A regarding injury to domesticated animals or boards); S.1689-186,
Gen.
Ct.
Reg.
Sess.,
(Mass.
2009),
available
at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1689 (same); H. 1250-186, Gen. Ct. Reg.
Sess., (Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/House/H1250
(seeking to insert section into General Laws chapter 140 permitting recovery of emotional
distress and loss of companionship for malicious injury to a pet); H. 1309-186, Gen. Ct. Reg.
Sess., (Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/House/H1309
(same).
131.
S. 1550-186, Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess., at 2 (Mass. 2009), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1550; S.1689-186, Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess., at 2
(Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1689. The definition in the bills is identical to a definition in “Proposed Legislation to Address the Wrong-
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any proposed or codified legislation, the Massachusetts bills would have
allowed damages for the intentional or negligent acts or omissions resulting
in the injury or death of an animal companion.132 The bill made little distinction in the type of damages recoverable for the injury or death of a
companion animal.133 Damages for death would have included:
fair monetary value of the deceased animal to his or her
human companions, including damages for the loss of the
reasonably expected society, companionship, comfort, protection and services of the deceased animal to his or her
human companions; reasonable burial expenses of the deceased animal; court costs and attorney’s fees; and other
reasonable damages . . . .134
Similarly, damages for injury would have included:
damages for the expenses of veterinary and other special
medical care required; the loss of the reasonably expected
society, companionship, comfort, protection and services of
the injured animal to his or her human companions; pain,
suffering . . . and loss of faculties sustained by the animal;
court costs and attorney’s fees; and other reasonable damages.135
ful Injury or Killing of Animal-Companion” authored by the Animal Legal Defense Fund.
See Waisman, supra note 66, at 20. The 2010 Model Animal Protection Laws published by
the Animal Legal Defense Fund does not include a definition of a “companion animal.” See
generally ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, MODEL ANIMAL PROTECTION LAWS (Stephan K.
Otto,
15th
ed.
2010),
available
at
http://www.aldf.org/downloads/ALDF_Model_Laws_v15_0.pdf (defining animal but not
companion animal) [hereinafter ALDF].
132.
S. 1550-186, Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2009); S.1689,186, Gen. Ct., Reg.
Sess. (Mass. 2009).
133.
S. 1550-186, Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2009), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1550; S. 1689,- 186, Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess.
(Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1689.
134.
S. 1550-186, Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Mass. 2009), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1550; S.1689,- 186, Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess., at
3 (Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1689.
135.
S. 1550-186, Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2009), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1550; S. 1689,- 186, Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess.
(Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1689. The proposed Oklahoma Pet Protection Act is similar in scope to Massachusetts Senate Bills 1689
and 1550 because it expressly creates a right to bring a civil action against a person, who
intentionally or negligently causes physical injury to, or the death of, an animal. See H.
2209-52,
1st
Reg.
Sess.
(Okla.
2009),
available
at
http://www.oklegislature.gov/AdvancedSearchForm.aspx. Oklahoma’s proposed act permits
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Courts would also be required to award at least $2,500 in punitive
damages for death or injury to the animal-companion.136 Proposed House
bills 1250 and 1309—relating to recovery for malicious injury to pets—
were equally broad in scope but narrower in text, by simply seeking to add
a new section to the General Laws that would allow for the recovery of
emotional distress and loss of companionship in suits brought for malicious
injury or killing of a pet.137
New York Bill A02711 is similar to both the T-Bo Act and the language used in the Connecticut statute because it defines a companion animal as “any dog or cat, and any other domesticated animal normally maintained in or near the household.”138 Similar to Massachusetts Senate Bills
1550 and 1689, it allows recovery for “the reasonably expected society,
companionship, comfort, protection and services of the injured companion
animal to his or her owner; court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; and
other reasonable damages,” for the intentional or negligent death of a companion animal.139 Courts have the option of imposing punitive damages if
the human companion to recover not only the pecuniary value of the animal and veterinary
expenses incurred, but also other expenses incurred attempting to reduce the effects of, or as
a consequence of, the pain, suffering or injuries sustained by the animal; emotional distress
and loss of companionship suffered by the human companion; and any other reasonable
damages that resulted from the death or injury to the animal. Id.
136.
S.1550-186, Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess., at 3 (Mass. 2009), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1550; S.1689-186, Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess., at 3
(Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S1689. The similarity with the proposed Oklahoma Pet Protection Act continues with regard to the punitive
damage provision. See H.2209-52, 1st Reg. Sess., at 3 (Okla. 2009), available at
http://www.oklegislature.gov/tomshell.aspx (setting minimum of $1,000 recoverable punitive damages for every intentional act).
137.
See H. 1250-186, Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess., at 2 (Mass. 2009), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/House/H1250; H.1309-186, Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess., at 2
(Mass. 2009), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/House/H1309. Each
sought to insert section 174E in chapter 140 of the General Laws that would state: “In suits
for damages for malicious injury or the killing of a pet, such damages may include emotional
distress and loss of companionship.” H.1250-186, Gen. Ct. Reg. Sess., at 2 (Mass. 2009),
available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/House/H1250; H.1309-186, Gen. Ct.
Reg.
Sess.,
at
2
(Mass.
2009),
available
at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/House/H1309.
138.
A.2711-232,
Leg.
Reg.
Sess.
(N.Y.
2009),
available
at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A02711&term=2009; see supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing T-Bo Act definition); supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing Connecticut definition).
139.
A.2711-232,
Leg.
Reg.
Sess.
(N.Y.
2009),
available
at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A02711&term=2009; see supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing recovery available under proposed Massachusetts Senate Bills 1550
and 1689). Under the proposed law, recovery for the intentional or negligent injury to a
companion animal would include the loss of reasonably expected society, companionship,
comfort, protection and services of the injured companion animal to the owner in addition to

2012]

BARKING UP THE WRONG TREE

263

the act was committed “with no justifiable purpose intentionally or recklessly.”140 The justification for the proposed New York Bill provided in its
sponsors memorandum is perhaps more notable than the language of the
bill itself. In the justification, the bill’s sponsors cite the need for legislative
guidance so that the judiciary may “relinquish the common law’s antiquated, scientifically obsolete assumption that animals are just ‘things.’”141
V.

A PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE LEGISLATION

The existing statutes and the language of the proposed bills create a
solid foundation for lawmakers to build upon enacting similar that would
allow for the recovery of non-economic damages for the death or injury of a
companion animal.142 While statutes may vary to account for state-specific
customs and practices, lawmakers should ensure that each statute includes
four basic components: (1) the definition of a “companion animal” or “pet”;
(2) a description of the actionable tortious conduct; (3) the recoverable
damages; and (4) parties exempt from liability or subject to limited liability.143
Existing case law suggests that dogs and cats will be the primary beneficiaries of a statute that allows for the recovery of non-economic damages
that arise as a result of death or injury to a companion animal or pet.144 The

the expenses for veterinary care, court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. A.2711-232,
Leg.
Reg.
Sess.,
at
2
(N.Y.
2009),
available
at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A02711&term=2009.
140.
Id.
141.
A.2711-232, Leg. Reg. Sess., A02711 Memorandum in Support of Legis.
(N.Y.Apr.
13,
2009),
available
at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A02711&term=2009&Summary=Y&Me
mo=Y,
232,
Leg.
Reg.
Sess.,
(N.Y.
2009),
available
at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A02711&term=2009; see supra note 86 (quoting bill’s
justification). In support of the position that companion animals should be considered more
than property, the bill’s sponsors stated that “Americans entering the 21st century recognize
the importance of our relationships with animals which has been demonstrated in study after
study” and provided statistics to demonstrate the integration of pets into the family structure.
A.2711-232 Memorandum in Support of Legis. (Apr. 13, 2009), Leg. Reg. Sess., (N.Y.
2009), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A02711&term=2009. A similar
sentiment was expressed by lawmakers in Colorado upon introduction of a bill that would
allow people to sue veterinarians and animal abusers. See Paek, supra note 36, at 518 (discussing Colorado House Bill 03-1260).
142.
See supra notes 97-141 and accompanying text (summarizing existing and
proposed legislation).
143.
See supra notes 97-141 and accompanying text (describing components of
existing and proposed legislation).
144.
See supra notes 50-96 and accompanying text (discussing judicial decisions
regarding companion animals).
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statutory definition, however, should not be limited to dogs and cats.145 The
proposed legislation from the Animal League Defense Fund (ALDF) provides a good starting point for an appropriate definition.146 The ALDF defined a companion animal as, “a dog; a cat; or any warm-blooded, domesticated nonhuman animal dependent on one or more human persons for food,
shelter, veterinary care, or companionship.”147 Lawmakers may also include
language similar to that used in the Connecticut statute by requiring that the
animal “normally [be] kept in or near the household.”148 A definition of this
kind would not be overly limiting so as to create the presumption that dogs
and cats are the only classes of animal companions that warrant recovery by
the human companion, but would still exclude livestock and animals kept
for research.
The actionable conduct should include both intentional and negligent
acts or omissions that result in the severe injury or death of a companion
animal.149 Judicial precedent has failed to “[keep] up with the reality of the
relationship between companion animals and their human caretakers.”150
This failure has resulted in under-compensation and under-deterrence.151
Recoverable damages should include compensation for the loss of the reasonably expected society, companionship, comfort, protection, and services
of the deceased or severely injured animal to his or her human companion(s); for reasonable burial expenses of the deceased animal; for court
costs and attorney’s fees; and for other reasonable damages resulting from
the willful, wanton, reckless, or negligent act or omission.152
145.
Waisman & Newell, supra note 50, at 70 (“The animal companion should be
defined to include a dog, a cat, or any warm-blooded, domesticated nonhuman animal sharing a demonstrable bond of companionship with one or more persons.”).
146.
The ALDF’s model statute no longer includes a definition of companion animals. See ALDF, supra note 131.
147.
Waisman, supra note 66, at 20.
148.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-351a(a) (2009).
149.
See Waisman & Newell, supra note 50, at 71 (noting that there are likely to be
relatively few instances where a jury would consider injury not resulting in death as meriting
recovery of non-economic damages).
150.
Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral and
Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 52 (2002); Accord supra notes
67-94 and accompanying text.
151.
See Elaine T. Byszewski, Comment, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful
Death Cases: A Survey of Current Court and Legislative Action and a Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 215, 225, 228, 232-40 (2003); Hankin,
supra note 124, at 325 (citing Margit Livingston, The Calculus of Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy, 82 NEB. L. REV. 783 (2004)); Cases cited supra note 78 (recognizing
but not allowing recovery for emotional loss).
152.
See S. 1550-186, Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2009); S.1689-186, Gen. Ct., Reg.
Sess. (Mass. 2009); ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, MODEL ANIMAL PROTECTION LAWS § VI
(B)
(Stephan
K.
Otto
ed.,
15th
ed.
2010),
available
at
http://www.aldf.org/downloads/ALDF_Model_Laws_v15_0.pdf (describing civil action for
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In contrast to the existing legislation, no cap should be imposed on the
amount of damages that may be awarded by a judge or jury for the thirdparty’s tortious conduct.153 Further, like the proposed Massachusetts and
Oklahoma legislation, a requirement for punitive damages should exist for
intentional acts. 154 As evidenced by the evolving roles of companion animals, American households are more likely to spend money on medical
wrongful injury or death of animal); see also Waisman & Newell, supra note 50, at 70 (“[I]n
addition to the ‘reasonably expected society, companionship, love and affection’ of the
animal that have been lost, compensation should be authorized for other reasonable damages
such as burial expenses.”); supra note 68 (discussing the evolution of recovery for parental
consortium). But see Victor E. Schwartz & Emily J. Laird, Non-Economic Damages in Pet
Litigation: The Serious Need to Preserve a Rational Rule, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 227, 260-68
(2006) (advocating against award of emotional damages for death or injury to companion
animals because of potential negative effects on veterinarians, animal medical manufacturers, pet owners, and pets). Burial or funeral expenses are often expressly listed as an element
of recoverable damages under wrongful death statutes. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-23-2-1
(2008) (permitting recovery of expenses for child’s funeral and burial following wrongful
death of child); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (2010) (permitting recovery of reasonable
funeral expenses); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3 (McKinney 2010) (permitting
recovery of reasonable funeral expenses).
153.
See Waisman, supra note 66, at 15 (“There appears to be general agreement . . .
that while the T-Bo Act will remain noteworthy as the first statute of its kind, a four-figure
cap is unacceptable and, indeed, would have a negative impact on litigation (from the plaintiffs’ perspective)”). When state legislatures first departed from the common law to create
new statutory rights to recover for wrongful death they typically imposed limitations on the
amount plaintiffs could recover. 2 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH AND INJURY § 7.1 (3d ed. 1992) (describing legislative origin of wrongful death actions and caps on recovery). Many of these early caps, however, were repealed. Id. at §§ 7.17.2 (stating that in 1893 twenty-two states limited recovery in wrongful death actions; however, currently no states impose limits for pecuniary damages). In the context of tort reform,
damage caps are frequently imposed on non-economic damages and cited as a means by
which awards may be made more predictable. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905,
915-17 (2008). Commentators and scholars have criticized these caps both on the grounds of
their constitutionality and their lack of efficacy. See generally John C.P. Goldberg, The
Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of
Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (arguing that the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment creates duty for each state to provide law for redress of private wrongs that
should be judicially enforced by establishing limits on how and why legislatures undertake
plaintiff-unfriendly tort reform); Robert S. Peck, Violating the Inviolate: Caps on Damages
and the Right to Trial by Jury, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 307 (2006) (arguing caps on damages
violate jury-trial right); Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damage Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2005) (arguing when non-economic damages are limited by caps plaintiff’s attorneys more vigorously pursue and juries award larger
uncapped economic damages).
154.
See S.1550-186 Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2009); S.1689-186, Gen. Ct., Reg.
Sess. (Mass. 2009); H.B. 2209, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); Lynn A. Epstein,
Resolving Confusion in Pet Owner Tort Cases: Recognizing Pets’ Anthropomorphic Qualities Under a Property Classification, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31, 32, 48 (2001) (advocating for the
award of punitive damages “where the conduct of the defendant is particularly heinous”).
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care and purchase pet health insurance.155 As a result the human companions expect that their animals will receive medical care when they are sick
or injured not unlike the treatment available in human medicine.156 While
lawmakers should not expressly exclude from the statute licensed veterinarians, governmental agencies, state employees acting within their capacity, and non-profits operated for the prevention of cruelty to animals, they
may limit exposure to these groups by limiting exposure to punitive damages for intentional, wanton and reckless acts.157 This limitation should
strike a fair balance between the interest in adequately compensating for the
loss experienced by human companions and the interest of opponents who
fear reducing the risk of exposing veterinarians to liability for noneconomic damages resulting in excessive damage awards.158

VI.

CONCLUSION

The role companion animals serve has evolved from property to family member. No longer beasts of burden kept solely to serve their owners,
animals now share in all the comforts of their human companion’s home. A
majority of American households consider their pet to be a member of the
family with a growing numbers of pet owners treating their companion
animal as a child. Despite these changes, the judiciary has failed to keep
pace with society’s changing attitudes resulting in inconsistent precedent on
the recovery of emotional damages for the severe injury or death of a companion animal. Allowing human companions to recover for their emotional
suffering will more accurately reflect society’s current view of companion
animals. It is time for state legislatures to act: to follow and improve upon
Tennessee’s lead and statutorily permit recovery of non-economic damages
for wrongful injury to or death of companion animals.

155.
See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text. See also Mary Margaret
McEachern Nunalee & G. Robert Weedon, Modern Trends in Veterinary Malpractice: How
Our Evolving Attitudes Toward Non-Human Animals Will Change Veterinary Medicine, 10
ANIMAL L. 125, 139-40 (2004).
156.
Hankin, supra note 124, at 316.
157.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-351a(d) (2009). See also Waisman & Newell, supra
note 50, at 70 (discussing punitive damages and recognition that veterinarians ability to
perform valuable services should not be unduly burdened).
158.
See Waisman, supra note 66, at 11 (noting that opponents argue veterinary
malpractice insurance premiums will increase if awards for emotional distress permitted
resulting in higher fees for veterinary care).

